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Abstract: The author discusses the phenomenon of panic in a wartime setting because of psychological 
warfare, as well as in other settings. 
 
One component of political psychology comprises how to influence large numbers of people to think, 
feel, desire, and behave.  Sometimes this influence is intended for the interests of these people, 
sometimes for the interests of the influencer.  Scientific experiments intended to validate theory and 
practice of influence often are constrained by moral, ethical, legal, logistic, political, and financial 
criteria.  Thus, when large numbers of people are influenced beyond the controls of the scientific 
experiment, scientists analyze such events in an a posteriori fashion.  They seek to infer the main 
independent variables, i.e., the causal factors leading to influence, after the fact as if the events 
constituted a natural experiment.  Inferring the causal factors of influence after such events allows 
scientists to identify not only how to influence people but also whether previously validated influence 
tactics and strategies still work and their theoretical underpinnings still seem to make sense. 
 
As an example, a television station based in the nation-state of Georgia recently broadcasted a mock 
newscast that Russia was invading Georgia with bombers, tanks, and ground troops.  (See Andrew 
Kramer’s article in The New York Times of March 14th entitled “Panic in Georgia after a Mock News 
Broadcast”).  Among at least some Georgians, panic ensued.  There were about 15 minutes to three 
hours’ worth of people dashing for safety, stocking up on bread and gasoline, overloading cell phone 
systems, and calling in to emergency rooms with a higher than usual frequency of complaints about 
chest pain and other symptoms associated with heart attacks. 
 
Questions then arise about what factors might have caused the panic, why many people did not panic, 
and how valid are the lessons learned from similar events. 
 
Kramer reports that a former director of the Georgian television station compared the situation to that 
which occurred in the United States on October 30, 1938, when the Mercury Theater of Orson Welles 
staged a radio broadcast of an adaptation of H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds.  In Wells’s story, 
Martians are attacking Earth—in Welles’ adaptation, central New Jersey.  Newspaper reports of this 
event included inferences and descriptions of panic among some people, including overloading 
telephone switchboards, running into the streets while manifesting terror, harassing police to obtain 
details of the invasion, and fleeing in automobiles. 
 
Very soon after this radio broadcast, Princeton University’s Hadley Cantril, a social psychologist, headed 
an investigation of the situation with the use of federal funds already available to study group and 
collective psychologies.  Data and analysis from the investigation resulted in The Invasion from Mars 
published in 1940 and authored by Cantril with significant help from Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog.  
(This book also was reviewed in significant psychology journals, e.g., by John Jenkins in the 1940 edition 
of the Journal of Applied Psychology and Paul Farnsworth in the 1941 edition of the Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology.) 
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Cantril and his associates identified specific factors that seemed to have helped lead people to panic.  
These factors included (1) a communication mode (viz., the radio) judged to be a highly credible source; 
(2) a seemingly authoritative speaker/ speaker’s voice within a highly credible news show format; (3) an 
alleged event which, if true, probably could not have been quickly controlled or stopped; (4) an alleged 
event that was easy to understand regardless of its credibility; (5) a “real world,” social context within 
which listeners approached the broadcast including unsettling social, political, and economic Issues (e.g., 
the Depression, alarming politico-military events in Europe); (6) an initial disclaimer that the events in 
the broadcast were fictional not being repeated soon enough for listeners who tuned in late but who did 
not stick around for any further disclaimers; (7) overt and latent beliefs and expectation about such an 
event—viz., the beliefs among some people that an invasion by Martians or other space aliens was 
likely); (8) non-existent or inadequate checking of alleged facts through alternative sources coupled with 
focusing on any data that would confirm alleged facts; (9) a negative correlation between socio-
economic class and educational level on the one hand and panic on the other; and (10) two pure but 
ambiguous psychological factors—personal susceptibility and felt ego involvement—negatively 
correlated with another pure but ambiguous psychological factor: critical ability.  (To be fair to Cantril, a 
significant effort was made to define each term, but the result was that one ambiguous term was 
defined by yet other ambiguous term.  As an example, personal susceptibility was defined as lack of self-
confidence, amount of worry, phobia, insecurity, and religiosity including, but not limited to, attendance 
at church.  Operational definitions of each of these terms and the weighting of these terms to each 
other and to panic—i.e., a delineation of modifying  and moderating effects--were not provided.  Also 
not provided were the putative relationships among all 10 of the above factors. 
 
IBPP readers may hope that the Cantril of the Georgian panic is already at work collecting data and 
engaged in analysis to infer causal factors of influence and how much of what might have been germane 
in the Welles adaptation applies to the Georgian televised broadcast.  It is encouraging (scientifically, 
not humanistically) that both events occurred in times of unsettling real world events.  In the Georgian 
these include the memories of a recent war against Russia, two breakaway Georgian territories seeking 
independence, significant domestic economic problems, and considerable domestic political instability.  
Other similarities include dramatized news broadcasts about military invasion and involved similar panic 
symptoms such as overloading communications systems and outright fleeing.  Three significant 
differences are the higher degree to which some Georgians have ascribed the broadcast to a 
government plot, the possibility that the Georgian broadcast might have been intended as satire, and 
the fact that the Welles adaptation occurred during an evening with high expectations of simulated 
horror potentially inducing panic, at least in New Jersey—viz., Halloween. 
 
Panic-inducing broadcasts obviously have a use (at least before one applies a means and ends 
assessment) during war, insurgency, pre-revolutionary and proto-revolutionary activity, electoral 
campaigning, coups, and blatant resource grabs.  Perhaps, more positively, there is theoretical work on 
Welles adaptation and on The War of the Worlds film adaptation by Steven Spielberg to suggest that 
cultural products that represent or induce panic may lead to a cathartic alleviation of anxiety and 
present stimulating opportunities for personal creativity activity (see Adela Abella’s article on “The War 
of the Worlds or the Transformations of Narcissism” in the 2008 edition of “La Psychiatrie de l’Enfant.”)  
And groups of people may work together to mitigate pre-existing panic (see Elise Clerkin and her 
associates’ “Sudden Gains in Group Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Panic Disorder” from the 2008 
edition of Behaviour Research and Therapy. . 
 
So, for those of us not already in a panic because of the recently passed health-care legislation in the 
United States, the reaction to it, or the process leading up to it, what might we conclude?  There may be 
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both enduring and changing causal factors implicated in influencing panic, even if more recent work on 
the psychology of rumor might suggest there is more that is enduing than changing (see Ralph Rosnow’s 
“Psychology of Rumor Reconsidered” in the 1980 edition of Psychological Bulletin and Nicholas 
DiFonzo’s Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches published in 2007.  From Cantril, 
through publications on the induction of collective panic during wartime by the National Research 
Council in 1943 and 1945, to the present, panic induction remains a political psychological tool. 
 
Future applied research must contend with ever-evolving social networking mediated by technology 
such as Twitter, Facebook, the blogosphere, and proliferations of television and radio channels.  But this 
research may need to be grounded in the remote past.  It is from evolutionary psychology perspectives 
that the socio-emotional core awaiting activation is to be found (see Randolph Nesse’s “An Evolutionary 
Perspective on Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia” in the 1987 edition of Ethology and Sociobiology and 
Isaac Marks and Adolf Tob&#7869;na’s “Learning and Unlearning Fear: A Clinical and Evolutionary 
Perspective” in. the 1990 edition of Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 
 
It is from the evolutionary perspective that one might best understand Franklin Roosevelt’s quote “So, 
first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, 
unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.”  Fear 
and even panic may or may not be adaptive.  Paradoxically, there will be times when no longer fearing 
and no longer panicking may be something that truly should induce fear and panic even beyond that 
experienced for invading Russians and Martians. [Comments may be sent to bloomr@erau.edu]. 
(Keywords: Information Warfare, Panic, Psychological Warfare.) 
 
 
 
 
 
3
Editor: Annals of Psychological Warfare: How to Induce Panic
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2010
